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BOOK REVIEWS
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING. By John T. Morse, Jr.
(Sixth Edition). By Harvey C. Voorhees. In two volumes. Little, Brown
and Co., Boston, i928. Pp. c 2134.
Morse on Banks and Banking has long been the leading legal treatise on this
important commercial subject. The first edition, published in 187o, was a small
book of five hundred and forty-two pages citing about twelve hundred cases.
The present edition is a work of two volumes containing over two thousand
pages and citing some seven thousand cases. The book bears the imprint of
several hands. The second edition was prepared by Mr. Morse in 1879 and in it
the author thoroughly revised his work. The third edition, edited by Mr. Frank
Parsons in i888, was also a thoroughgoing revision. The fourth edition, by the
same editor in 19o3, contained some additions but left the book much as it was
in the preceding edition. The fifth edition, edited by Mr. James N. Carter in
1917, and the present edition, left the book substantially unchanged except for
the new citations and the insertion of new statutes. The net result is that the
book is in substance what it was forty years ago except for the insertion of the
recent cases and statutes.
A book edited in this way is not an adequate treatise on the present-day law.
The law relating to banks and banking has been developing rapidly. The number of cases in recent years has been tremendous. In the Third Decennial Digest
there are, under the caption of Banks and Banking, over seven hundred columns
of cases. Not only has there been a good deal of legislation but new banking
practices have developed and new problems have arisen. It is impossible to deal
with these adequately without remolding the text.
It is illuminating to see how a particular problem is treated in the book, for
example the problem of the liability of a bank which has allowed a depositor to
place on deposit to his individual credit checks drawn by him as a fiduciary and
subsequently to withdraw the deposit. In the section treating this question it is
stated that:
"the banker is not justified in refusing to honor the depositor's check because
he knows or believes that the check is an appropriation of funds to a person
or for a purpose to whom or for which the depositor is not lawfully authorized to appropriate these funds."
Later in the same section it is said that:
"When a bank receives a deposit from one acting in a representative
capacity it cannot justify a payment to him of the amount deposited if it
knows, or facts are presented which if acted upon, would disclose, that the
fund is about to be wrongfully and unlawfully diverted from the true
owner."
If both of these statements are correct, the bank is placed in a truly unfortunate
position. Under the decisions in England and in the United States neither statement is correct. What has happened is that the former statement first appeared
(821)
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in the second edition and is based on the English decision of Gray v. Johnston;'
and the latter statement was added in the fifth edition to take care of a dictum
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in Parks v.
Knickerbocker Trust Co.' The leading case in Ncw York' is not cited in this
section, although it is cited in a subsequent one and the later decision in Whiting
v. Hudson Trust Co.' is not cited at all. Even more serious, perhaps, is the
failure to cite Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan,' although this case was included in
the reports which the editor has examined. There is no reference in this section
to the provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act which has been adopted in
eleven states.
So too in other parts of the book there is the same tendency to insert the
new matter into text or footnotes without considering its effect upon what is
already stated. As a result, it is often impossible to ascertain the views of the
author or editor; and frequently cases relating to the same matter are inserted
in such diverse places that it is difficult to find the cases. All that can be said
is that most of the important decisions are to be found somewhere in the footnotes. The shortcomings of the book cannot altogether be laid at the door of
the present editor. They are largely due to the nature of his task of putting
the new wine into the old bottles.
Austin W. Scott.
Harvard Law School.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING.

By Charles E. Clark.

West

Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1928. Pp. viii, 581.
This book is a welcome addition to the Hornbook Series. The reviewer
is beset by the desire to sermonize upon statements drawn from its preface
and moved to join in the discussion of certain mooted questions presented by
the text itself. If the writing of this book needs justification it may be found in
the first paragraph of the preface which seems worth quoting at length.
"Of late years the idea of pleading as a science has fallen into disfavor. This is shown in many ways: By the objection of lawyers to
changes from abroad, however thoroughly supported by experience; by the
attitude of bar committees, who examine only on minute points of local
practice; by the decisions of courts which construe the codes as though
they 'speak for themselves,' without reference to their historical background; and, by no means least, the lack of attention paid to the subject
by text-writers and students. Except for local and semi-local practice
and form books, one must go back to the early days of the codes to find
any attempts to set forth the subject as a unified whole. Since this situation is felt to be unfortunate, the present book represents an attempt to
alleviate it."
There is reason for dissatisfaction with the progress of pleading reform
in America. There is ample ground for the suspicion that very many pf our
IL. R. 3 H. L. 1, 14 (1868).
2 137

App. Div. 719, 721, 122 N. Y. Supp. 521, 524 (910).

'Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. io6, 112 N. E. 759 (i916).
'234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (923).
5 274 U. S. 473, 47 Sup. Ct. 661 (1927).
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judges either do not know or do not care what it is all about. There is no
path through the maze of pleading decisions. Some courts still cling to many
of the defects of the common law specifically sought to be remedied by the
code. Many others, crediting the original code with an infallibility of expression, are content merely to construe its terms as they would those of some
written constitution. Here and there are evidences of the fatal belief that
with the adoption of the code we have arrived at" a satisfactory stopping point
in procedural evolution, and there are accompanying proofs that at these points
the ossification of this body of law has already begun. There is today a pressing need for speed and certainty in the administration of the civil side of our
law, which, though it has not excited the same clamor, quite matches the need
so obvious upon the criminal side. It is unfortunately true that many of our
judges need a very definite stimulus toward procedural reform, even where
there is granted the power to modify procedure through court rules. Parenthetically it may be remarked that some of us have found our hopes dashed
by the reluctance with which courts both in England and in America seem
to exercise this power. Even the New York court, which of the American
courts seems to have gone the farthest, can not be charged with having used
its power recklessly or even freely. But even after a court has promulgated
a set of such rules it must not be thought that the need for progressive and
liberalized thinking is at an end. Such rules are not a panacea. No mere
mechanical device can ever make up for a lack of ability or progressiveness
in the legal profession. Professor Clark is, therefore to be praised for having
provided a very definite stimulus in the right direction.
He is quite correct in asserting that no progress can come from merely
an intensified study of some local code. The best that such a study can
produce is a sort of intensified provincialism. Some one has said that the ideal
of a college course should be to teach the student how to live, not merely
how to make a living. Similarly, the objective of the study of any branch
of procedure should be greater than merely to learn how to use the existing
tools of the craft. The chief concern should be the improvement of basic
processes. Only upon such an ideal can we realize the hope expressed by the
author "that code pleading will lose its distinctive characteristics in a general
American system applied in practically all the states." 1
The vast labor and real scholarship that have gone into this book will not
be apparent to one who has never tried to wade through the problems of code
pleading, and it is a matter for sincere regret that the compendious nature of
such a work denies to historical considerations the treatment they so much deserve. It is perhaps a valid criticism that Professor Clark has dipped this portion of his discussion even more closely than seemed necessary. The footnotes
throughout the book are packed with a wealth of material, the like of which
is not to be found in any other book on the subject. The copious references
to the law reviews are particularly valuable.
But the very fullness of these footnotes has produced what seems to the
present writer to be an undue compression of the text, and leaves the feeling
that the book has two distinct objects and that it would have been better
1
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to have subordinated one of them. That is, the author might have reduced
the quantum of the footnotes and might have more fully elaborated his theories,
or he might have increased the book to truly encyclopedic proportions. The
writer wishes the first of these had been chosen. This feeling will not be
shared by those who do not equally feel the need of a detailed and completely
fresh analysis of the true functions of pleadings, though it will be generally
agreed that few writers are as well prepared for such an analysis as is Professor Clark.
Mere differences in the matter of legal theory can not be considered in
any light as defects in this book. The present writer is not willing to go to
the lengths to which Professor Clark seems to be willing to go in abandoning
the concept of the "theory of the pleading." 2 Certainly the author does not
intend that it shall wholly disappear, for no efficient pleader is likely ever
to be satisfied with a mere colorless enumeration of facts. The selection
for emphasis and for logical presentation in any stage of the case must
always be based upon some theory of right or defense. There may have been
in the past an objectionable over-emphasis of this concept, but to abandon it
entirely would allow the suit to drift like a rudderless ship veering before
chance winds. After such an abandonment what becomes of our ideal of
relevancy in allegation and proof? Not that relevancy is an end in itself,
but only that expedition and accuracy are possible only with definiteness of
aim. It does not seem necessary to say with Professor Clark that the theory
of action is necessarily "in contravention of the code ideal by which the
pleadings are to set forth facts and not law." 3 We might seize upon the
author's own statement that "the difference between statements of fact and
statements of law is almost entirely one of degree only," ' and assert, as a deduction from experience, that the more logical and orderly the pleading is,
the greater is the likelihood that a "theory of the case" will be disclosed.
With the argument that the pleader should not be held rigidly to an announced
theory there will be ready agreement.
It is also stated that the pleader "should not be forced to fulfil any requirement of having and maintaining a single legal theory of his pleadings;
he should be held only to the ideal of reasonably fair notice of the facts of
his case."' What facts? All? Or only the material ones? Which are material? How can you tell except as you test the allegations by some theory
of the case? The spirit of the code calls for a concise statement of facts
without repetition, and this somehow seems to demand at least a tentative
choice of theory. Some middle ground between the hard formalism of the
common law and unrestrained procedural fumbling (in which trial lawyers have
always been too proficient) must be found. Professor Clark is wholly correct in his insistence that the judge and not the parties must decide when there
has been sufficient notice of the respective claims of the parties, but even the
2Ibid. 54, 55, 64, 174-177.
3

Ibid. 54.

'Ibid. i9.
Ilbid. x77.
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judge is entitled to a disclosure of the theory upon which the party elects
to rest.
The same emphasis upon facts as facts seems to color the author's definition
of a cause of action under the codes' and his discussion of the problem of
splitting of causes of action 7 but the limitations of a book review do not permit
an exposition of every difference in view. It may, however, be a sufficient
testimonial to the stimulating nature of Professor Clark's book that the reviewer with difficulty restrains the impulse to enter upon an extended discussion of these and other topics. Vigorous stimulation of thought is the thing
most needed just now and this book provides it.
A general estimate of the book compels one to say that it is fair; it
is comprehensive; it is scholarly; it is timely; it is worth the careful study
of the schoolman, the lawyer or the judge. Professor Clark is to le congratulated upon its all-round excellence.
Lynwia P. Wilson.
Contell Law School.
CAsEs ow EQuiry.

By Edgar Noble Durfee. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1928. Pp. xxviii, 830.

A review of a casebook prepared by a recognized scholar is apt to be a
rather futile performance at best. On the one hand, there is the mathematical
or statistical review-an exposition of the table of contents, accompanied by an
enumeration of the cases from England, South Dakota, and New York, and of
the proof or clerical errors detected by the reviewer. On the other, there is the
evangelical review, in which the reviewer expounds his notions of the organization of a totally different sort of casebook, which, it must usually be conceded,
the editor under review avowedly did not undertake. The first type adds little
to the store of human knowledge, whether of the editor or of the reader; the
second, though more interesting, is more or less irrelevant and more or less
unfair. In the end, the reviewer is too frequently driven to a few rather obvious
comments capped off with the trite and self-evident statement that the true test
of the book will come in the classroom.
Even in the face of this counsel of despair, there are, perhaps, a few observations that may properly be made in respect of Professor Durfee's casebook.
In the first place, the book evidences long and careful preparation. It is replete
with notes, not merely citations and digests of cases, statutes and law review
articles, but long textual discussions of related questions. There are further
considerable extracts from texts in Part I; an example in point is a ten-page
quotation from Langdell's Summary of Equity Pleading. These textual notes
and extracts are, of course, labor-saving devices which should be especially valuable wherever the course is rather closely restricted in hours. The cases themselves are interesting and well-selected; they tend, perhaps, to the expository,
rather than to the problem type. The statements of facts are frequently cut or
restated, but enough work is left for the student.
'Ibid. 75 et seq.
7
Ibid. 318 et seq.
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The scope of the book, as indicated by its table of contents, is quite broad;
it includes equity jurisdiction, pleading and practice; equitable remedies; and
vendor and purchaser. Necessarily, the treatment of some of the topics is highly
restricted. Thus, although Part I is devoted in large part to equity procedure,
there are no cases. (although, as already stated, there is some text material)
dealing primarily with equity pleading, nor with equitable defenses; there are
relatively few cases bearing upon the problems relating to jury trial, or to appellate review. Professor Durfee has deliberately left the questions arising out of
the attempted fusion of law and equity under the codes for treatment elsewhere,
although he seems to lament the omission on the ground that the treatment elsewhere may in fact never take place.
The conscious and specific direction of attention to materials on equity procedure seems to this reviewer a chief virtue of this casebook, and the failure to
treat the subject more completely, a defect. It may be said, of course, that such
materials more properly belong in the advanced courses in procedure. But in
fact many of the problems are not considered there at all. Moreover, if it be
agreed that a somewhat thorough knowledge of common law pleading and practice is essential to an understanding of modem procedure and practice, must it
not also be agreed that considerable knowledge of equitable procedural devices
is likewise essential, particularly since so many code provisions sprang fullblown from that source. In other words, might not one first year course properly include a study not only of common law and equitable remedies, but also of
the distinctive common law and equitable procedural devices which have survived
in the codes, and hence which are fundamental to an understanding of the code
cases.
Within the confines he set himself, Professor Durfee has done a thorough,
scholarly job. That his book will find a warm welcome goes without saying.
Roswell Magill.
Law School, Columbia University.
LEcTuREs ON LEGAL Topics, 1923-1924.

The Macmillan Co., New York,

1928.

Pp. viii, 485.
This is the fifth volume of a series, consisting of lectures delivered before
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The lectures in thte
present volume were delivered during the Court Year, 1923-1924. The subject
matter of these lectures covers a wide range of subjects. Some of these appeal to the layman as well as to the lawyer, for example, the Reparations
Problem by Paul D. Cravath, Collective Bargaining Between Employers and
Workers by Morris Hillquit, and Efforts for Divorce Reform by Walter
George Smith. Of the addresses that are primarily of interest to the practicing lawyer some deal with such general topics as Reflections of a Trial Justice by Jacob Marks, Justice of the Municipal Court of the City of New York,
The Relation of the Practicing Lawyer to the Efficient Administration of
Justice by Cuthbert W. Pound of the New York Court of Appeals, The
Administration of the Criminal Law by Charles S. Whitman, former Governor
of New York State, Progressiveness of New York Law by Frank H. Hiscock,
then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, How Not to Try a
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Case by Daniel F. Cohalan, former Justice, Supreme Court, New York
County, and The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems
by Professor Walter W. Cook.
Justice Marks made an interesting suggestion with the view of elevating
the legal profession. He thinks that it would be helpful in this direction if
those admitted to the bar were allowed to practice at first only in the inferior
courts as attorneys, and were permitted to become counsellors only thereafter,
upon passing a second examination. Governor Whitman's address contains a
very vivid description of criminal trials in England and in France, which
brings home the fact that we have to learn a great deal in this respect from
England. Professor Cook urged upon the profession the need of better analytical methods for the satisfactory solution of legal problems. "I do not take
the view," he said, "that analysis alone will solve these problems. Analysis
is necessary but not sufficient. Analysis enables us to see first what our problem is, to discover hidden analogies, or differences which but for the analogies might have escaped our attention."
Especial attention should be called to the three addresses on Banking Institutions and the Law by Cornelius Doremus, Joseph M. Hartfield and Henry
Crofut White. These addresses set forth the relationship between the lawyer
and the banker and the difficult legal problems with which the modern banker
has to deal. Mr. White dealt with the legal problems presented by the modern
trust.
Of the remaining addresses, pre-eminently technical in character, Professor Edwin M. Borchard discussed the importance of Declaratory Judgments
as instruments of preventive justice. In this country the subject of declaratory judgments is still new, and because of unfamiliarity with its function
on the part of the legal profession, it has not always met with the cordial
reception it deserves. Professor Borchard said: "The English have had the
benefit of this procedure now for over forty years. I am in hopes that this
new statute in New York, as it becomes known to the Bar, and as its important functions become more generally appreciated, will open a similar prospect
of benefit to the people of this State."
Dean Bogert's address contains a thorough discussion of the subject of
Insurance Trusts from the standpoint of New York law. In it he doubted
the validity of the ordinary funded insurance trust under the New York
rule against accumulations, and suggested as the most satisfactory method
of solving the problem the obtaining of a declaratory judgment as to its validity or invalidity under Section 473 of the Civil Practice Act.
Of especial importance to the trial lawyer of New York are the two
addresses by Mr. Young B. Smith, Professor of Law at Columbia University
and now Dean of the Law School, on the subject of Motions During thie
Trial of a Civil Action Before a Jury, and The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457-A of the New York Civil Practice Act.
Ernest G. Lorenzen.
Yale Law School.
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(Second Edition). By Ernest Freund. Ameriican Case Book Series. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1928. Pp. xxi, 745.
This second edition of Professor Freund's case book on administrative law
is more than what the term "second edition" ordinarily implies. It is a reconstructed edition into which much work has gone, not only to bring the book
abreast of the principal developments in case law since the first edition, which
appeared in 1911, but as well to point and clarify the subject, and so to make
the book a better cutting tool.
Declaring that administrative law can be most effectively dealt with in a
law school as a course on the exercise of administrative power and its
subjection or non-subjection to judicial control, Professor Freund divides the
subject into three parts: (i) administrative power and action, (2) relief
against administrative action, and (3) administrative finality. Yet in his
actual arrangement of the case material he consolidates the last two. This
is but natural, and is explained by their close connection.
It is the last chapter, entitled Jurisdictional Limitations and Administrative Finality, that is certain to attract the most attention, partly because Professor Freund has treated it in a new way and with a new arrangement of
cases, but chiefly because the pace with which administrative finality is achieved,
the degree to which it is achieved, and the manner in which it is brought
about, prognosticates, better than anything else, the future of administrative
law. It would seem that Professor Freund endeavors, in arranging his material on this topic, to make clear in just what types of questions finality is
accorded. His arrangement is factual rather than philosophically analytical.
He does not attempt the functional ascent. Perhaps it is too early for this.
And certainly in a case book, the prime object of which is to "introduce" law
students to the general subject, the first consideration should be to see that
they are in fact introduced, and so are put well in the way of becoming acquainted with it. The realistic treatment has, therefore, much to commend it.
This is not say that the functional realism may not be the greater realism,
when it is worked out, but that is for tomorrow or the day after.
Perhaps the most striking success of the book is in its further pointing, its
sharper delimitation of the subject of administrative law. A definite objective
is sought in each chapter and a definite objective is attained. And the chapters
all together work toward a unity of concept. To achieve this result has required more willingness to confine the subject within restricted limits than most
others who have dealt with it have shown. "An effort has been made especially
to relieve the course as far as possible of purely constitutional problems, which
are taken care of in other courses." It may have seemed an act of selfabnegation to let some of these old favorites go, and perhaps Professor
Freund Pas not parted with them without a pang. But his book has undoubtedly been a gainer by it. Some other compilers of case books might be
instructed by this sacrifice.
About a fifth of the cases included in the book were decided since the
first edition appeared, a good proportion of them being cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States. An excellent example of how these
newer cases complement or otherwise redress the older ones is afforded by
CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.
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Tod v. Waldman' in its relation to Chin Yow v. U. S? Other striking exampies might be given. These additions are of signal merit. Yet it has not
been found necessary to draw on the newer material at all in treating some
of the topics, as witness chapter four, on Summary Action, a chapter containing five cases, only one of which was decided in the present century. And
no better illustration of maximum result in minimum compass is to be found
in the book.
About contemporaneously with these cases Mr. Freund is publishing a
systematic study of Administrative Powers over Persons and Property upon
the basis of a comparative study of statute law. "This," he states, "gives an
entirely different approach to the subject of administrative law showing that
legislation has been an even more important factor in its development than the
decisions of the courts." But very little legislative material is included in the
case book, and it seems evident that Mr. Freund still regards the case material
as the best approach for the law student. In this he would appear to be wise,
particularly so long as administrative law continues to be treated as law "controlling the administration." Judicial control, or the absence of it, is the
matter of administrative law which is of most importance to the average law
student. When he has learned this, and its foundations are still pre-eminently
common law rather than legislative, he may then go on to a study of the
legislative factor.
Harold M. Bowtman.
Law School, Boston University.
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES. (Revised Edition). By Reynolds Robertson. Prentice Hall, Inc.,
New York, 1928. Pp. xlii, 418.

There are, it is believed, but few practitioners with sufficient selfassurance to carry them to the cafl of their first case by the Chief Justice
at Washington, when they have no more experienced colleague to bear the
procedural responsibility, without going through the usual preliminary ordeal:
to wake at 3 A. M., bathed in sudden perspiration; to toss sleepless until
morning; to rush breakfastless to the office, and there, in breathless anxiety, to
snatch down one book after another, until at last the danger which the subconscious demon has suggested is proved either to be imaginary, or, alas, in a few
cases, to be a hopeless obstacle to the last chance of having the case reviewed.
It is to prevent such experiences as these that Mr. Robertson's excellent
book is primarily designed, and it should so result. The several steps essential
in each possible contingency are tabulated, explained and then summarized, with
such fool-proof clarity as to allay the fears of the most nervous and to inspire
confidence in the most timid.
The book does not purport to discuss the substantive law, nor the history
of the present procedure, confining itself to the practice as it now exists. In
this limited field the book speaks with authority. One feels that the writer
'266 U. S.'113, 45 Sup. Ct. 85 (1924).
'2o8 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (igo8).
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has certainly not forgotten anything. Why should he, when every day or so
for the past six years, he has been called on, as assistant to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, to answer the very questions to which we casual federal.
practitioners think we know the immediate answers, but cannot be quite sure.
Mr. Robertson has the orderly mind which is the first requisite for a
book of this kind, as his Table of Chapters and Table of Contents at once
prove. He evidently wrote this book himself, which is more than can be
said of many modem text books. One need not fear the carelessness of nonunderstanding assistants.
Among the most valuable and unique features are the frequent practical
suggestions, as to what the Clerk will gladly do to save counsel trouble, and
tc enable him to keep his record straight. Such is the warning to tell the
Clerk whether it is desired to have the denied petition for rehearing left in
the record; the suggestion as to the early preparation of the statement of points
and designation of parts of the record to be printed; the method of submission
of a motion to dismiss by the Clerk, saving a trip to Washington by counsel
for appellee. A similar suggestion to "Ask the Clerk" is made in connection
with Original Actions where the rule is meagre and the practice has developed
in the Clerk's office.
In view of the passage of the act of January 31, 1928, and the amendment thereto of April 28, 1928, abolishing writs of error, procedurally but not
jurisdictionally, shortly before the publication of the first edition, the author has
published a revised edition, discussing these statutes, and including the revised
rules of the Supreme Court, adopted June 5, 1928, effective July 1, 1928.

The

revised edition also contains a new and valuable chapter on the procedure in
original actions. The appended forms cover all papers which it is necessary for
counsel for either side to prepare in connection with a case in the Supreme Court.
The general arrangement of the book is convenient and careful. It would
add to the speed with which the book could be used if the Chapter, Section and
Part numbers were given on each left hand page instefad of the title of the
book, thus facilitating both the location of cross-references and the citation of
the text.
Henry S. Drinker, Jr.
Philadelphia,Pa.
By
Charles Pergler. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1928. Pp. viii, 222.
It is hardly accurate to describe all of the opinions considered in this
book as judicial interpretations of international law in the United States. In
the majority of them the court was interpreting the Constitution, the statutes,
or decisions of political organs of the United States on such subjects as the
limits of United States territory, the nationality of individuals, the scope of
the treaty power, and kindred matters, and anything it may have said about international law was dictum. While such opinions give evidence of the way in which
the Constitution, the Congress, and the Executive have interpreted the powers of
the United States under international law, they can not be regarded as conclusive
evidence of the courts' views on international law. It is comparatively rarely
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.
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that national courts have an opportunity to apply such law. The most common
instance is in prize cases which are excluded from this volume, since it deals
only with relations in time of peace. In some of the cases, however, such as
those interpreting treaties, defining territorial boundaries in rivers and on the
sea, and those recognizing exemptions from and extensions to territorial jurisdiction, the courts have found themselves obliged to make decisions without
guidance from any controlling legislative or executive action and consequently
have sought light in international law. It would be interesting to examine the
extent to which the courts have, in fact, gone to the proper sources of international law and applied rules which would receive the general approval of
civilized states when confronted by such situations. Dr. Pergler has not made
such an examination. It may be questioned whether the law applied under the
name of international law in some of the opinions cited, such as those in regard to the jurisdiction of foreign merchant vessels in port, and in regard
to the punishment of extra-territorial crime would be supported by an impartial
examination of the sources of that law.
The reviewer emphasizes this because he thinks there is a real danger
that books of this type will create an erroneous impression as to what international law is. American jurists have been particularly prone to be led astray
by the following argument: "American courts say they apply international law
-they follow such and such a rule-therefore such and such a rule is international law." It would be equally conclusive for a lawyer to tell the United
States Supreme Court: "Judges of Massachusetts are bound by the constitution-they have interpreted the constitution thus and so-therefore the constitution means thus and so."
While Dr. Pergler recognizes the proper sources of international law, and
clearly describes the limitations upon the capacity of national courts to apply
that law, he does not sufficiently warn the unwary reader against assuming that
opinions of the United States courts are authoritative interpretations of international law, as they are of municipal law. In fact he seems himself to
have been led into a confusion of the obligations of international and of
municipal law while discussing treaty making. Although it is correct to say
that without congressional legislation a treaty which stipulates the payment
of money, "is not operative in the sense of the constitution," it certainly does
not follow that, "A treaty, stinding alone and without the consent of Congress,
cannot require the United States Government to expend money." Dr. Pergler
himself recognizes this when he later points out that adverse legislation by
Congress does not terminate a treaty as an international obligation but merely
renders it unenforceable by the United States courts.
While the bibliography as well as the text indicate that the author has
not fully considered the relations between international and municipal law,
and while readers should be warned against blindly accepting all of the rules
which courts have recorded as international law, often in dicta, lawyers and
students may find it convenient to have in handy form the gist of some five
hundred opinions of American courts dealing with international matters.
Quincy Wright.
Law School, University of Chicago.
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TvuAnE ASSOCIATIOxS:

THE LEGAL ASPECTS.

By Benjamin S. Kirsh.

The

Central Law Book Co., New York, I928. Pp. 271.
As a result of the rapid expansion of trade associations and of their close
interlacement with the business structure of the country, increasing importance
attaches to the legal aspects of this phase of American commercial and industrial development. To thousands of American business men the question of
what may or may not be done lawfully by collective effort through trade associations is a matter of vital importance and serious concern.
Large scale production, mounting costs, new methods of marketing, and the
keenest kind of competition, have produced a situation where the need of co-operation among producers, manufacturers and distributors, for purposes of stabilizing business and of preventing uneconomic competition, is being felt and voiced
not only by business men but to an increasing extent also by legislators and the
courts. The extent to which the latter, in particular, have taken cognizance of
these new developments and needs in our economic life, which were hardly visualized when the Sherman Act was enacted, thirty-eight years ago, is a striking
illustration of how judicial opinion slowly but surely adjusts itself to the economic changes wrought by time and circumstances. The decisions dealing with
trade associations under the Sherman Act already embrace a body of law of
considerable magnitude. With the advent of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the Clayton Act, the Export Trade Act and those anti-trust sections of the
Wilson Tariff Act of x894 which are still in force, the volume of cases has been
augmented still more.
All this has by no means simplified matters, however, and a mere glance at
the variety of problems involved, as well as at their complex character, involving
in large measure an intertwining of legal and economic thought, principles and
practice, should readily convince one of the need of an up-to-date guide book on
this subject.
The author of this book, formerly special assistant to the U. S. Attorney in.
New York, has had a wide experience in handling anti-trust cases. He combines
a thorough knowledge of the law with an intimate grasp of applied economics.
This is a decided feature of his book, and stands out very clearly in the chapters
on: trade association statistics, uniform cost accounting methods of trade associations, credit bureau functions of trade associations, uniform basing point systems of trade associations, standardization by trade associations, and collective
purchasing functions of trade associations.
In these chapters the author analyzes with great acumen all of the more
important decisions applying to trade associations, especially the Maple Flooring1
and the Cement' cases, which he regards as "basic and epochal in announcing a
liberal construction of the anti-trust laws, in their application to the cooperative
functions of trade associations," ' and as "marking a distinct turning point in
the judicial attitude concerning trade association activities." 4
'Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. U. S., 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct.

578 (1925).
'Cement

Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. U. S., 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup.

Ct 592 0 925).
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4Ibid.
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A separate chapter is devoted to foreign trade functions of trade associations. It deals mainly with the Webb-Pomerene Act and its application to
American export trade, and in connection therewith evaluates the recent development of international cartels. This chapter includes also an illuminating analysis of the cases instituted by the U. S. Department of Justice within recent years
under the anti-monopoly provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act against the foreign
sisal, potash and quinine interests.' In that connection, the author ventures
the view that the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall ' in The Bank of the U. S
v. The Planters'Bank of Georgia may ultimately prevail in the matter, as to the
suability of a foreign sovereign under the American anti-trust laws, which was
one of the points at issue in the recent potash case. In the case mentioned,
Justice Marshall said, "that when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of
its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen."
In this era of mergers, holding companies, foreign subsidiaries of domestic
corporations and international patent cartels, the subject of patent interchange,
treated in chapter five, is one of timely importance, and the author's analysis of
the Bathtub,' Addyston Pipe,' Hardwood" and other leading cases should therefore be welcomed by students of this modern phase of business interrelations.
Of equal current interest are the subjects treated in chapter ten, code of
business ethics and commercial arbitration. A considerable number of trade
associations throughout the country are giving particular attention at the present
time to schemes of self-regulation. The author's advice on this subject deserves
careful consideration:
"The association however must be careful to remain within its legitimate
sphere of self-regulation. If it trespass upon the forbidden territory of
price-fixing, allocation of territory, limitation of production, blacklist, boycott, or the like, under the guise of beneficent enforcements of its rules, it
becomes subject to the punitive provisions of the Sherman Law." U
The author's method of setting off legal problems and court decisions against
their economic and social background may be seen to advantage, also, in the final
chapter, entitled Restricting Channels of Distribution. After pointing out
the growing emphasis attached at the present time to the marketing of goods
rather than to their production, he analyzes the two general classes of cases
dealing with collective endeavors on the part of members of trade associations
'U. S. v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U. S. 268, 47 Sup. Ct. 592 (0927) (Sisal
case) ; U. S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, S. D. N.Y., in Equity, No.
42-124 (Potash case); U. S. v. N. V. Amsterdamsche Chininefabriek, S. D.
N. Y., in Equity, No. 44-384 (Quinine case). Criminal and forfeiture proceedings are also pending in this matter. See (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 891 n. i.
a9 Wheat. 9o4 (U. S. 1824).
'Supra note 5.
'Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. U. S., 2 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct.
9

(1912).

'Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899).
" American Column & Lumber Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct.
114 (1921).
11 Op.

cit. supra note 3, at 239.
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to control, restrict and dictate the channels of distribution. Here, as well as
throughout the book, the clear-cut way of stating just what the courts regard as
permissible or as violative of the law furnishes the reader a fund of instructive
and helpful information.
At the end of each chapter are listed the significant features noted by the
courts with regard to measures and practices permitted or forbidden. These
excellent summaries add materially to the practical value of the book. So also
do the copious footnote references to legal, economic and historical literature
bearing on the subject matter discussed in the text, a table of one hundred sixtythree cases, and a good index.
William F. Notz.
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

